Theory of mind and conceptual enrichment: What makes the intensionality task more difficult than the false belief task?

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Theory of mind and conceptual enrichment: What makes the intensionality task more difficult than the false belief task? [poster w pliku pdf]
Theory of mind and conceptual enrichment: What makes the intensionality task more difficult than the false belief task? [poster w pliku pdf]

Arkadiusz Gut  & Maciej Haman

Theory of mind and conceptual enrichment: What makes the intensionality task more difficult than the false belief task?

 

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Opacity is commonly viewed as the hallmark of the mind. This statement expresses the general belief that children’s understanding of intensionality (referential opacity) is tied to their understanding of mind as a representational medium (Kamawar & Olson, 1999, 2011; Apperly & Robinson 2001, 2003; Hulme et al. 2003). Bearing in mind the contemporary discussions over an understanding of intensionality/opacity by pre-school children, we attempted to answer the question of how far passing the false belief test is a good predictor that a child holds the knowledge that mental representations are opaque. To contribute to this debate, we have run a complex, multidimensional study involving 195 children in four age groups and two separate experiments: 3-year-olds (N1=30), 4-year-olds (N1=30, N2=25), 5-year-olds (N1=30, N2=25), and 6-year-olds (N1=30, N2=25). Children were asked to solve the classic false belief task (FBT; deceptive box version: verbal and nonverbal version), and a series of newly designed intensional tests IT (verbal and nonvebal versions).